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1. Introduction
Research in accounting indicates that management has strong preferences
for actual earnings to exceed market expectations or analysts’ consensus
forecast (e.g. Brown 2001; Matsumoto 2002). Research also indicates that
management tends to issue downwardly-biased guidance (Soffer, Thiagara-
jan, and Walther 2000; Choi and Ziebart 2002; Baik and Jiang 2006). To
the extent that analysts adjust for the downward bias in management’s
guidance by issuing forecasts that are above management’s guidance, they
would increase the likelihood that the ﬁrm’s actual earnings will miss ana-
lysts’ forecasts, thereby resulting in adverse stock price impact for the ﬁrm.
However, prior archival and experimental research indicates that analysts
do not fully adjust their forecasts for the downward bias in management’s
earnings guidance issued between quarterly earnings announcements
(e.g., Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki 2006; Tan, Libby, and Hunton 2002).1
This adjustment failure accounts in part for the predominance of ﬁrms with
actual earnings that meet or beat the consensus analysts’ forecast (e.g., Bar-
tov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki 2004). Prior
research has examined potential explanations for the bias in management
guidance (e.g., Skinner and Sloan 2002; Richardson et al. 2004), but not the
causes of analysts’ adjustment failure.
Our study examines how analysts’ incentives might interact with the
consistency and magnitude of bias in management’s guidance in determining
* Accepted by Michel Magnan. We would like to thank the editor (Michel Magnan) and
anonymous referees, our colleagues at Bentley University, Cornell University, and Nany-
ang Technological University, workshop participants at the Indian School of Business,
Indiana University, Notre Dame University, and the University of Texas at Austin for
their helpful comments, as well as Nicholas Seybert and Bo Zhou for research assistance.
1. We deﬁne earnings guidance (also called an earnings warning) as a management forecast
of earnings for the current quarter issued during the three months between quarterly
earnings announcement dates.
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the extent to which analysts adjust their earnings estimates for the known
bias. Speciﬁcally, we address two related questions in two experiments: (a)
does the consistency or inconsistency in management guidance bias over
time affect the extent to which incentives inﬂuence analysts’ bias adjust-
ments (Experiment 1); and, (b) when analysts have a high incentive to pre-
serve a good relationship with management, will the magnitude of
management guidance bias inﬂuence the extent to which analysts adjust
(Experiment 2)? We use an experimental rather than an archival approach
to investigate these issues to hold constant ﬁrm characteristics, obtain clean
measures of analysts’ incentives, and control for differences in intervening
events for ﬁrms with consistent and inconsistent guidance bias.
Understanding the circumstances under which analysts adjust (or fail to
adjust) for guidance bias is important because analysts are important ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries and their failure to adjust for guidance bias potentially
allows ﬁrms to strategically meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecast (Bar-
tov et al. 2002; Cotter et al. 2006), with potential adverse consequences for
investors’ welfare. Gaining insight into the causes of bias in analysts’ fore-
casts can help investors who rely on such forecasts make their own bias
adjustments and aid regulators in determining more effective remedies
should such bias be judged to be detrimental to investors’ interests (e.g., Le-
vitt 1998; Cox 2005).
In Experiment 1, 47 experienced sell-side analysts make earnings fore-
casts in response to management guidance for the current quarter. We
manipulate guidance track record by providing a summary table indicating
that guidance bias is consistent or inconsistent over time. We manipulate
analysts’ incentives by instructing them that their only concern is being
accurate (accuracy incentives) or that they have developed good relationship
with management over time (relationship incentives). The mean guidance
bias (guidance minus actual) in prior periods is held constant at )$0.01
(i.e., downwardly-biased by 1 cent). The results indicate that analysts with
accuracy incentives adjust for the downward guidance bias, while those with
relationship incentives do not. The difference in bias adjustment between
analysts with accuracy versus relationship incentives is magniﬁed when the
guidance track record is inconsistent. A striking result in Experiment 1 is
that analysts with relationship incentives fail to adjust for guidance bias
even when the guidance track record shows the same guidance bias of 1
cent in each period. This suggests that analysts with relationship incentives
are reluctant to adjust their forecasts by even one cent when this may lead
to the ﬁrm failing to beat those forecasts. In a post-experiment debrieﬁng,
analysts indicate that issuing forecasts above management’s guidance would
damage their relationship with management, suggesting that analysts’ failure
to adjust for known guidance bias when they have high relationship incen-
tives may be intentional.
In Experiment 2, we assess whether analysts with relationship incentives
are more likely to adjust for guidance bias when the average magnitude of
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the guidance bias is larger ()2 cents), given that larger guidance bias allows
the analyst to adjust without causing the ﬁrm to miss the forecasts. Thirty-
four experienced sell-side analysts are given the same relationship incentives
instruction as in Experiment 1 and are assigned to either the consistent or
inconsistent track record conditions. While analysts in both conditions
adjust to some degree, analysts make a larger adjustment in the consistent
condition relative to the inconsistent condition. The overall magnitude of
the upward adjustment is about one cent, which is smaller than the average
two cents downward bias evident from the track record. The ﬁndings in
Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with an elastic justiﬁcation explanation
(Hsee 1995), which predicts that analysts with relationship (versus accuracy)
incentives will use the ambiguity in the inconsistent guidance track record
to avoid adjusting for guidance bias, subject to the constraint that any
adjustment does not cause a missed forecast.
Cumulatively, our ﬁndings suggest that multiple factors contribute to
the somewhat paradoxical ﬁndings that analysts fail to fully adjust for
downwardly-biased management guidance, even though they appear to be
aware of this general bias amongst reporting ﬁrms. We demonstrate that
incentive factors (accuracy versus relationship) matter, and that the effects
of incentives are constrained by the historical consistency and magnitude of
guidance bias. The current study also contributes to the behavioral decision
making literature by demonstrating constraints to the inﬂuence of elastic
justiﬁcation (Hsee 1995) in an important business setting.
In the following sections, we develop our hypotheses, describe the
experiments and their results, and conclude with a discussion of the implica-
tions of our ﬁndings and limitations of our paper.
2. Hypothesis development
Management guidance contributes to beatable forecasts
Prior studies indicate that management earnings guidance issued within
three months of the earnings announcement date is typically downwardly
biased (e.g., Soffer et al. 2000; Choi and Ziebart 2002; Baik and Jiang 2006;
Cotter et al. 2006). For example, in the most recent sample of 7,671 ﬁrm
quarters of earnings guidance issued during the period 1995 to 2002, for the
point estimate or midpoint of range guidance, 52 percent are downwardly
biased, 19 percent neutral, and 29 percent upwardly biased (Baik and Jiang
2006). Among those ﬁrms with downwardly biased guidance, the median
forecast error is 8 percent.2
Prior studies also suggest that the bias in short-term management guid-
ance greatly increases the likelihood that analysts will reduce their forecasts
during the quarter to beatable levels. Cotter et al. (2006) examine 8,198 ﬁrm
quarters of guidance issued between 1995 and 2001. They ﬁnd that,
compared to a control sample of non-guiding ﬁrms, analysts’ forecasts for
2. Bok Baik (personal communication, 2005).
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guiding ﬁrms are more optimistic before guidance is issued.3 Nevertheless,
analysts’ forecasts for the guiding ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less optimistic than
the control sample after the guidance is issued. As a consequence, guiding
ﬁrms are 1.7 times as likely to meet or beat the ﬁnal consensus analyst fore-
cast relative to a control sample. Similarly, in Baik and Jiang’s (2006) sam-
ple of ﬁrms issuing guidance, actual earnings beats the consensus forecast
before guidance 42 percent of the time as compared to 61 percent of the
time after the issuance of the guidance. Bartov et al.’s (2002) 1983–1997
sample shows similar effects, with the magnitude increasing in more recent
years. All of these ﬁndings strongly suggest that analysts revise their current
quarter forecasts in response to management guidance, but do not fully
adjust those forecasts for the downward bias in the management guidance.
This ﬁnding is all the more striking because other research indicates that
analysts are aware of guiding ﬁrms’ general tendency to issue downwardly-
biased guidance (Tan et al. 2002; Libby, Tan, and Hunton 2006). Prior
research does indicate the economic importance and beneﬁts to managers of
meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002; Skinner and Sloan
2002; Richardson et al. 2004), but does not explain why analysts appear to
cooperate in this endeavor.
Why don’t analysts adjust for known guidance bias?
Incentive effects
Analysts’ incentives might affect the magnitude of their adjustment for
known bias in management forecasts. Analysts face two conﬂicting incen-
tives when they issue forecasts and research reports (Schipper 1991). They
have an incentive to be accurate because their reputation within the ﬁrm
and in the industry is determined in part by their accuracy, and research
shows that more accurate analysts are better rewarded and more likely to
be hired by prestigious brokerage ﬁrms (e.g., Hong and Kubik 2003). On
the other hand, analysts have an incentive to make forecasts that are
aligned with the interests of the ﬁrms they cover. Prior research indicates
that analysts’ forecasts are biased because they have incentives to please
management, and thereby obtain access to private information and help
their ﬁrms obtain investment banking opportunities (Afﬂeck-Graves, Davis,
and Mendenhall 1990; Dugar and Nathan 1995; Hunton and McEwen
1997; Lin and McNichols 1998; Antia and Pantzalis 2006; Libby, Hunton,
Tan, and Seybert 2008). Recent regulations have sought to reduce both
sources of incentives that lead to biased forecasts.
Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), effective in 2000, prohibits selective
information disclosures to analysts and requires that any material non-pub-
lic disclosures to analysts must be made simultaneously to the public. Also,
3. Bartov et al. (2002) also show that analysts’ forecasts trend downwards during the quar-
ter in that they move from being optimistic at the start of the quarter to being pessimis-
tic at the end of the quarter.
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in 2002, the New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers implemented rules that limit communications between the
research and investment departments of ﬁnancial ﬁrms. However, the effec-
tiveness of these regulations in reducing analysts’ conﬂict of interests has
been met with skepticism because ﬁrms allegedly continue to employ invest-
ment banks with analysts who are supportive of their stocks (Springsteel
2003). There is also empirical evidence that post Regulation FD, analysts
who have better relations with management have greater access to questions
during conference calls (Mayew 2008). Thus, it appears as though incentives
to maintain a good relationship with management continue in the post-
Regulation FD environment.
As indicated earlier, research suggests that management earnings guid-
ance is commonly downwardly biased (e.g., Soffer et al. 2000; Choi and Zie-
bart 2002; Baik and Jiang 2006; Cotter et al. 2006), which appears to reﬂect
an intentional strategy of managing investors’ expectations. Analysts who
reinforce this strategy by failing to adjust or under-adjusting for known
downward bias in guidance will likely be favorably received by manage-
ment. Accordingly, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 1: Analysts’ adjustment for a ﬁrm’s management guidance
track record will be greater when accuracy incentives are emphasized
than when relationship incentives are emphasized.
Track record consistency and elastic justiﬁcation effects
Research on elastic justiﬁcation indicates that decision makers use ambigu-
ity in available evidence to support actions that conform to their incentives
(Hsee 1995; Schweitzer and Hsee 2002). The premise is that people care
about the justiﬁability of their actions and judgments, and directional goals
will have a greater effect when the desired conclusion can be justiﬁed based
on the available information (Koonce and Mercer 2005).
In the context of management guidance, archival research shows that
management’s guidance track record varies in its consistency, introducing
ambiguity in assessing the direction or magnitude of management’s bias.
For instance, Baik and Jiang (2006) ﬁnd that in an eight-year period
between 1995 and 2002, 50 percent of the ﬁrms that issue guidance do so
three or more times. Among these ﬁrms, 68 percent are consistently down-
wardly biased or accurate, and 49 percent are consistently downwardly
biased.4 In addition, for those ﬁrms that are consistently downwardly
biased, the magnitude of the bias varies.
Thus, while we predict in Hypothesis 1 that analysts with relationship
incentives are less likely to adjust for guidance bias than those with accu-
racy incentives, elastic justiﬁcation theory (Hsee 1995) suggests that the
4. Bok Baik (personal communication, 2005).
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extent this occurs depends on track record consistency. Speciﬁcally, the
difference in guidance bias adjustment between analysts with relationship
versus accuracy incentives is likely larger when management’s guidance
track record is inconsistent (allowing for elastic justiﬁcation to occur) than
when it is consistent.
We ﬁrst discuss the situation where analysts have accuracy incentives.
When management’s guidance history has a record of being consistently
biased in the same direction and by the same magnitude (e.g., downwardly-
biased by one cent), there is no ambiguity that a systematic pattern of guid-
ance bias exists. Analysts with accuracy incentives are therefore likely to
fully adjust for the guidance bias (i.e., in our example, adjust their forecasts
upwards by one cent). When management’s guidance track record is incon-
sistent, the nature of the adjustment by analysts with accuracy incentives
depends on the pattern of guidance bias. For instance, no adjustment is
likely if the pattern is completely random. On the other hand, some adjust-
ments are likely to the extent that there is some indication of a systematic
bias.
Consider the following guidance history with an inconsistent track
record that we employ in our experiment (see section 3 for an explanation
of this design choice): downward bias of 1 cent (Period 1), zero bias (Period
2), and downward bias of 2 cents (Period 3). This track record does not
have a consistent direction of guidance bias in that one of the periods has
no guidance bias, and the magnitude of the bias also varies over time. How-
ever, two out of the three periods involve downward guidance bias, so ana-
lysts with accuracy incentives likely infer that downward guidance bias is
likely for the next quarter’s guidance. Further, prior research shows that
analysts place greater reliance on the most recent quarter earnings, in that
the most recent period may be most predictive of management’s current
intentions (see Hunton and McEwen 1997). Accordingly, analysts with
accuracy incentives who seek to adjust for any downward guidance bias
may place greater weight on the most recent period’s guidance bias and
adjust their forecasts upwards by two cents (see Figure 1).
When analysts have relationship incentives, as suggested by elastic justi-
ﬁcation theory, they are less likely to make adjustments for guidance bias
when the track record shows an inconsistent as opposed to a consistent
bias. With an inconsistent track record, there is ambiguity as to whether
systematic guidance bias exists, and analysts with relationship incentives can
use this ambiguity as justiﬁcation not to fully adjust for any guidance bias.
With a consistent track record, there is less ambiguity, and correspondingly
less justiﬁcation not to adjust.
However, an important institutional feature constrains the extent to
which analysts adjust for guidance bias, even in the consistent track record
situation. Speciﬁcally, a primary concern of management is to avoid missing
analysts’ forecasts (Bartov et al. 2002; Skinner and Sloan 2002; Richardson
et al. 2004), and analysts can foster a good relationship with management by
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enabling them to achieve this objective. Recent research also indicates that
relationship incentives magnify analysts’ tendency to issue optimistic fore-
casts at the beginning of a period and pessimistic forecasts at the end of the
period (Ke and Yu 2006; Libby et al. 2008), a pattern preferred by manage-
ment as it increases the likelihood of management meeting or beating market
expectations. Thus, the adjustments made by analysts with relationship
incentives are constrained by whether their adjustments cause management
to miss analysts’ forecasts. Elastic justiﬁcation theory suggests that these
analysts with relationship incentives are more likely to adjust for guidance
bias in the consistent (versus inconsistent) track record condition; however,
we anticipate that adjustments in the consistent track record condition are
made only to the extent that these adjustments do not cause a missed fore-
cast, and smaller or no adjustments are made when a full adjustment causes
a missed forecast. Figure 1 shows a graphical presentation of this prediction.
As depicted in Figure 1, we predict an interaction between incentives and
track record such that the difference in adjustment for guidance bias as a
function of relationship versus accuracy incentives is magniﬁed with an incon-
sistent track record. We formally state this interaction hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 2: The difference in adjustment for guidance bias when rela-
tionship versus accuracy incentives are emphasized will be greater
when the bias in the ﬁrm’s guidance track record is inconsistent than
when it is consistent.
We test these hypotheses using two experiments. In Experiment 1, we test
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in a setting where analysts are given
summaries of management guidance and actual earnings (the management
guidance track record) over three prior periods. We manipulate both analysts’
Figure 1 Prediction on joint effects of analysts’ incentives and track record
consistency
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incentives (relationship versus accuracy) and track record (consistent versus
inconsistent). We design the track record such that it exhibits an average
downward bias of one cent, so that it corresponds to the average guidance
error found in archival studies (Baik and Jiang 2006). In this case, any upward
adjustment (assuming that analysts do not make half-cent adjustments) will
lead the ﬁrm to miss or at best meet their guidance. In Experiment 2, we use a
design that is a subset of that employed in Experiment 1 to further examine
Hypothesis 2 and test the boundaries of when analysts would adjust for guid-
ance bias. Speciﬁcally, we assess whether analysts with relationship incentives
exhibit the same effects of a consistent versus inconsistent track record when
the magnitude of the downward bias is raised to two cents. In this situation,
an adjustment of one cent will still enable the ﬁrm to beat its guidance. We
anticipate that analysts with relationship incentives will be more willing to
make adjustments for guidance bias in this situation.
3. Experiment 1: Effect of incentives and track record consistency
Experiment 1 is designed to test whether incentives to preserve a good rela-
tionship with management (versus incentives to be accurate) curtail analyst
adjustments for the bias, and whether the consistency in guidance bias over
time moderates this differential adjustment for guidance bias.
Method
Our design is a 2 · 2 between-subjects design, with incentives (accuracy,
relationship) and track record (consistent, inconsistent) as independent vari-
ables. Participants are 47 experienced sell-side ﬁnancial analysts employed
by a major worldwide investment banking, trading, and brokerage ﬁrm.
They have an average of 11 years of analyst experience. All but three are
chartered ﬁnancial analysts.
Analysts complete the task during the ﬁrm’s training course.5 As an
incentive to participate, each analyst is provided a $50 contribution to a
charity of his ⁄her choice. The trainer is briefed by one of the researchers in
advance on the administration of the experiment, and provided with the
research instruments sorted in random order. Each research instrument
comprises two sealed envelopes, one containing the case materials and
response sheets, and the other containing the debrieﬁng and demographic
questions. The trainer is unaware of the experimental conditions.
The case materials contain background information about a company
called Kappa, Inc., a manufacturer of semiconductor and telecommunication
materials. The analysts are provided with a table including the quarterly
5. Analysts completed this experiment in the afternoon. Earlier in the morning, they com-
pleted another unrelated experiment. We create a dummy variable that denotes the
experimental condition analysts are in during the morning experiment. No results
change when we include this dummy variable as a covariate or as another independent
variable, and the dummy variable and its interactions with the afternoon experimental
treatments are not signiﬁcant.
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actual earnings per share for ﬁscal years 2003, 2004 and 2005, as well as the
ﬁrst quarter of 2006. The table includes guidance given in three of the prior
quarters. Analysts are also given the consensus analyst earnings per share
forecast for the second quarter ($0.24) and full year ($0.78) of 2006. Next,
they read the following earnings guidance statement from Kappa manage-
ment, which is issued on May 31, 2006:
The company expects earnings per share for the second quarter ending
June 30, 2006 to be below expectations due to weaker than expected
sales. Earnings per share are estimated to be approximately $0.18 for
the quarter.
The ﬁrst manipulation focuses on analysts’ incentives. In this manipula-
tion, we do not manipulate actual incentives per se, but provide instructions
designed to allow our participating professionals to bring their knowledge
of and behavior learned in response to real world incentives to our experi-
ment (Libby, Bloomﬁeld, and Nelson 2002, 803). Following the accu-
racy ⁄ relationship with management tradeoff described by Schipper 1991, in
the accuracy condition, analysts read the following statement: ‘‘Assume that
your only concern is the accuracy of your forecast.’’ In the relationship con-
dition, analysts read the following statement: ‘‘Assume that over time, you
have gradually developed a good professional relationship with Kappa manage-
ment.’’6 Given that analysts face dual incentives to be accurate and to please
management (Schipper 1991), we expect that the latter statement will induce
greater incentive to be biased towards pleasing management and thus a
lower propensity to adjust for guidance bias, while the former statement will
induce lesser incentive towards pleasing management.
The history of management’s earnings guidance is manipulated at two
levels: consistent or inconsistent pattern of downwardly-biased earnings
guidance. This history is shown in a summary table of guidance issued and
actual earnings subsequently announced for each period; details are shown
in Table 1.7 This format is designed to ensure that participants are aware of
the ﬁrm’s guidance track record.
In the consistent condition, analysts see a table of earnings and guid-
ance history which reveals that management’s guidance is consistently lower
than actual earnings by the same amount ($0.01) in each period. We use
a guidance error (guidance – actual) of minus (–) $0.01 because this
corresponds to the whole cent closest to the median guidance error in the
6. This incentives manipulation is the same as that used effectively in Libby et al. 2008.
7. This situation is analogous to one where analysts review summary records of manage-
ment guidance and the subsequent earnings releases, and identify a consistent pattern of
guidance bias. Our discussion with a senior director of the participating ﬁrm indicates
that analysts track and keep records of the guidance issued and actual earnings reported
by ﬁrms that they follow.
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Baik and Jiang (2006) downwardly biased guidance sample.8 In the incon-
sistent condition, they see the same actual earnings per share. We impose
a few conditions in designing the guidance history for the inconsistent
TABLE 1
Experiment 1: Details of track record manipulations
Panel A: Consistent track record manipulation
Year
First
quarter
Second
quarter
Third
quarter
Fourth
quarter Year
Fiscal 2003
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.06 0.12 0.18
0.14
0.15 0.51
Fiscal 2004
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
0.16
0.17 0.19 0.20 0.75
Fiscal 2005
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.21 0.25
0.15
0.16 0.18 0.80
Fiscal 2006
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
Panel B: Inconsistent track record manipulation
Year
First
quarter
Second
quarter
Third
quarter
Fourth
quarter Year
Fiscal 2003
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.06 0.12 0.18
0.14
0.15 0.51
Fiscal 2004
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
0.17
0.17 0.19 0.2 0.75
Fiscal 2005
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.21 0.25
0.14
0.16 0.18 0.8
Fiscal 2006
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
(The table is continued on the next page.)
8. The median guidance error [(Guidance – Actual) ⁄Absolute (Actual)] of their sample is
).079. The value selected, )$0.01, is the whole cent nearest that amount (average guid-
ance error = ).063 for the three periods).
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condition. First, the error in management’s guidance is to vary in each per-
iod, but the average guidance error over the three periods is held constant
at )$0.01. Second, there must be evidence of a downward guidance bias in
two (but not all three) periods. The reason is that a downward guidance
bias in all three periods would suggest a consistent (rather than inconsistent)
downward guidance history, even if the magnitude of the bias were to vary
in each period; in contrast, having a downward guidance bias in only one
of the periods might not establish any track record. Third, the magnitude
of the downward guidance bias is to differ in each of these two periods.
Otherwise, having the magnitude of the downward guidance bias constant
in two of the periods may also suggest a consistent rather than inconsistent
track record. Given these conditions, we design the inconsistent condition
to be one where guidance is downwardly biased by one cent in Fiscal 2003,
accurate with zero bias in Fiscal 2004, and downwardly biased by two cents
in Fiscal 2005. We design the last, rather than the ﬁrst, ﬁscal year to have
the larger downward bias of two cents for the following reason: if the ﬁrst
ﬁscal year had the downward bias of two cents and the last ﬁscal year had
the downward bias of one cent (a downward trend in bias), a ﬁnding that
analysts in the management relations condition do not adjust for guidance
bias (Hypothesis 2) could be attributable either to the presence of incentives
or the possibility that the downward guidance bias is decreasing over time.
We design the second ﬁscal year to have zero bias in order to keep the
mean guidance error across the three periods at )$0.01.
Analysts are asked to provide earnings per share forecasts for the quar-
ter ending June 30, 2006, full year ending December 31, 2006, and full year
ending December 31, 2007. Additionally, they record their level of conﬁ-
dence in the accuracy of their forecasts (0% = not at all conﬁdent,
100% = extremely conﬁdent). Afterward, they complete the debrieﬁng and
demographic questions.
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Notes:
Experiment 1 manipulates two between-subjects variables: Track Record (consistent,
inconsistent) and Incentives (accurate, relationship). The Track Record manip-
ulation varies the consistency in the downward bias associated with manage-
ment guidance issued by management in prior periods. Panels A and B show
the ﬁrm’s guidance track record that is shown to analysts. For both consistent
and inconsistent Track Record manipulations, the average guidance bias over
the three periods is a downward bias of one cent ()$0.01). In the consistent
Track Record manipulation, each period is associated with the same amount
of downward bias of one cent. In the inconsistent Track Record manipula-
tion, Fiscal 2003 has a downward bias of one cent, Fiscal 2004 has no bias,
and Fiscal 2005 has a downward bias of two cents.
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Results
Manipulation checks
As a check on the incentives manipulation, we ask analysts whether the
instructions indicate that they have gradually developed a good professional
relationship with management over time, or that their only concern is the
accuracy of their earnings forecasts. All analysts in their respective
TABLE 2
Experiment 1 results
Panel A: Mean analysts’ forecasts (standard deviation in parentheses)
Track record
Incentives Consistent Inconsistent
Amount Accuracy
(n = 12)
Relationship
(n = 12)
Accuracy
(n = 11)
Relationship
(n = 12)
Information provided:
Point guidance $0.18 $0.18 $0.18 $0.18
Mean guidance bias )$0.01 )$0.01 )$0.01 )$0.01
Analyst forecasts:
Current quarter EPS 0.1917
(0.0039)
0.1825
(0.0075)
0.2045
(0.0144)
0.1783
(0.0058)
Adjustment to current
quarter’s guidance of $0.18
(forecast – guidance)
+0.0117* +0.0025 +0.0245* )0.0017
Panel B: ANOVA Results for adjustment to current quarter’s guidance
Source SS df MSE F-Statistic p-value
Track Record 0.0002 1 0.0002 2.96 0.092
Incentives 0.0037 1 0.0037 48.86 0.000
Track Record x Incentives 0.0009 1 0.0009 11.34 0.002
Error 0.0032 43 0.0001
Notes:
Experiment 1 manipulates two between-subjects variables: Track Record (consistent,
inconsistent) and Incentives (accurate, relationship). The Track Record
variable manipulates whether the ﬁrm’s prior guidance is associated with a
consistent or inconsistent downward bias. The Incentives variable manipulates
whether analysts are informed that their only concern is the accuracy of their
forecasts (accuracy incentives), or that they have developed a good
relationship with the ﬁrm’s management over time (relationship incentives).
* Signiﬁcantly different from zero; p = 0.000.
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treatment conditions correctly respond to this question. We ask two manip-
ulation check questions related to the track record treatment. The ﬁrst ques-
tion asks analysts to indicate on a nine-point scale (1: much too low; 5:
about right; 9: much too high) whether in prior periods, Kappa’s guidance
is generally too high, too low, or about right compared to the actual earn-
ings announcement. The mean response is 2.40 (range 1 to 4) indicating that
all analysts are aware that the guidance is downwardly biased. The second
question asks whether Kappa’s earnings guidance in prior periods is always
too low by the same amount. Every participant responds correctly to this
question (‘‘yes’’ for those in the consistent condition, ‘‘no’’ for those in the
inconsistent condition).
Hypothesis tests
Our primary dependent variable is the analysts’ adjustment to management
guidance issued in the current quarter (forecast – guidance). Table 2, panel
A shows descriptive statistics for analysts’ forecasts for the current quarter
and adjustments to management guidance. Table 2, panel B reports results
of a 2 · 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA), with incentives and track record
conditions as between-subjects factors and adjustment to management guid-
ance in the current quarter as the dependent variable. We ﬁnd a marginally
signiﬁcant main effect of track record (p = 0.092), a signiﬁcant main effect
of incentives (p = 0.000), and a signiﬁcant track record by incentives inter-
action (p = 0.002).
Hypothesis 1 predicts that analysts’ adjustment for bias in the manage-
ment guidance track record will be larger for analysts in the accuracy condi-
tion than those in the relationship condition (a main effect). Consistent with
Hypothesis 1, analysts’ bias adjustment is greater in the accuracy condition
than in the relationship condition (t = 6.732, p = 0.000; one-tailed).9 In
the accuracy condition, analysts’ mean bias adjustment is +1.78 cents,
which is signiﬁcantly greater than zero (t = 7.098, p = 0.000). However, in
the relationship condition, their mean bias adjustment is +0.04 cents, which
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero (t = 0.296, p = 0.770). Bias adjust-
ment is greater for analysts in the accuracy condition both when track
record is consistent (t = 3.743, p = 0.002) and inconsistent (t = 5.637,
p = 0.000).
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the difference in analysts’ adjustment for
guidance bias in the accuracy and relationship conditions will be greater
when the track record is inconsistent than when it is consistent. The differ-
ence in bias adjustment between analysts in the two incentive conditions is
+2.62 cents when track record is inconsistent and +0.92 cents when it is
consistent. A planned contrast test indicates that, as predicted by Hypothe-
sis 2, this difference is signiﬁcant (t = 3.243, p = 0.002; one-tailed).
9. The forecasts have unequal variances, and contrast tests we report adjust for unequal
variances.
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For analysts in the accuracy condition, bias adjustments are always sta-
tistically greater than zero whether the track record is consistent (mean =
+1.17 cents, t = 10.383, p = 0.000) or inconsistent (mean = +2.45 cents,
t = 5.655, p = 0.000). This bias adjustment is larger in the inconsistent
condition than in the consistent condition (t = 2.872, p = 0.015), consis-
tent with the pattern depicted in Figure 1 for the accuracy condition, reﬂect-
ing the larger bias in the most recent period.
For analysts in the relationship condition, their next-period forecasts
are never signiﬁcantly different from management guidance of 18 cents.
Mean bias adjustment is not different from zero in either the consistent con-
dition (mean = 0.25 cents, t = 1.149, p = 0.275) or inconsistent condition
(mean = )0.17 cents, t = )1.000, p = 0.339), and there is no signiﬁcant
difference between the mean bias adjustment between the consistent and
inconsistent conditions (t = 1.177, p = 0.246).10 This pattern of results
matches the ﬂat line depicted for the relationship condition depicted in Fig-
ure 1 and is congruent with the explanation that analysts do not adjust for
guidance bias when any such adjustment would cause risk of management
missing the analysts’ forecasts (Figure 1).11
Debrieﬁng
In the post-experiment debrieﬁng questionnaire, we ask analysts whether
their relationship with clients who purchase a stock would be harmed or
improved if the ﬁrm beats their most recent quarterly earnings forecast. On
a scale from 1 (harm) to 9 (improve), the mean response is 8.83, signiﬁ-
cantly greater than the midpoint of 5 (t = 69.12, p < .0001). We also ask
analysts whether their relationship with company management would be
harmed or improved if they regularly issue forecasts above management
earnings guidance and the company fails to meet or beat these forecasts.
On the same nine-point scale, the mean response is 2.23, signiﬁcantly lower
than the midpoint of 5 (t = )22.59, p < .0001). This ﬁnding is consistent
10. We repeat our analyses using analysts’ 12-month current year and succeeding year fore-
casts, and obtain results similar to those reported above. Immediately after forecasting
EPS, analysts provide conﬁdence ratings concerning the accuracy of their forecasts.
Results indicate that conﬁdence is lower in the inconsistent than the consistent track
record conditions (means = 29.26 and 40.83, respectively; F = 11.47, p = .0015), and
in the relationship than the accuracy incentives conditions (means = 28.75 and 40.87,
respectively; F = 10.64, p = .0022). The interaction term is not signiﬁcant (F = 1.946,
p = 0.17). This suggests that participants are aware of the added difﬁculty in predicting
earnings in the inconsistent guidance bias condition as well as the effect of their failure
to adjust for guidance bias where relationship incentives cause a conﬂict of interests.
11. Analysts completed another experiment prior to this. We create a dummy variable that
denotes the experimental condition participants are in for the earlier experiment. We
obtain the same results as our main analyses whether the dummy variable is included as
a covariate or another variable that interacts with our main independent variable. The
dummy variable is never statistically signiﬁcant in any analyses.
200 Contemporary Accounting Research
CAR Vol. 27 No. 1 (Spring 2010)
R
tra
cte
with the notion that analysts do not adjust for management guidance bias
to avoid management missing analysts’ forecasts and thereby maintaining a
good relationship with management.
Finally, we ask the analysts to indicate the likelihood that Kappa’s
management was intentionally misguiding the market in its earnings guid-
ance, using a nine-point scale (1 = extremely unlikely; 9 = extremely
likely). We ﬁnd a main effect of track record in that analysts in the consis-
tent condition view management as being signiﬁcantly more likely to have
intentionally misguided the market than those in the inconsistent condition
(means = 7.54 vs. 5.43, respectively; F = 36.60, p = 0.000). The main
effect of incentives (p = 0.778) and its interaction with track record
(p = 0.169) are not signiﬁcant. These results suggest the following: (a) ana-
lysts are aware of a guidance track record indicating intentional bias on the
part of management in the consistent condition; yet, those in the relation-
ship condition fail to adjust for the bias while those in the accuracy condi-
tion do adjust; (b) uncertainty as to whether the guidance bias is intentional
in the inconsistent track record condition might offer a convenient rationale
for lack of adjustment for guidance bias when analysts face relationship
incentives (e.g., elastic justiﬁcation) or set a ceiling on adjustment due to
the risk of causing a missed forecast.
4. Experiment 2: Effect of magnitude of guidance bias
A major ﬁnding in Experiment 1 is that analysts in the relationship condi-
tion fail to adjust for guidance bias whether the track record shows a con-
sistent or inconsistent guidance pattern, even though an adjustment of one
cent would still enable management to meet analysts’ forecasts. The failure
to adjust for guidance bias in the consistent bias setting is particularly
striking because the consistent downward bias of one cent is observed in
all three consecutive periods. It appears that analysts’ incentives are for
management to beat rather than merely meet analysts’ forecasts. In Exper-
iment 1, we employ a mean guidance bias of one cent ($0.01) to have
external correspondence with the median guidance bias documented in
empirical-archival studies (Baik and Jiang 2006). However, any adjustment
of one cent or more implies that management will be unable to beat ana-
lysts’ forecasts, a boundary condition for the operation for our theory (see
ﬂat line in Figure 1). In Experiment 2, we employ a larger guidance bias
of two cents. With a larger guidance bias, analysts have room to partially
adjust for the bias (by an average of one cent) to attain greater accuracy
(Hong and Kubik 2003), while still allowing management to beat the ana-
lyst’s forecasts. We expect that guidance bias adjustment will be larger
when track record is consistent (when there is less elastic justiﬁcation not
to adjust) than when track record is inconsistent (when there is more
elastic justiﬁcation not to adjust), subject to the constraint that the
adjustments still enable management to beat analysts’ forecasts (see slope
in Figure 1).
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TABLE 3
Experiment 2: Details of manipulations
Panel A: Consistent track record manipulation
Year
First
quarter
Second
quarter
Third
quarter
Fourth
quarter Year
Fiscal 2003
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.06 0.12 0.18
0.13
0.15 0.51
Fiscal 2004
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
0.15
0.17 0.19 0.20 0.75
Fiscal 2005
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.21 0.25
0.14
0.16 0.18 0.80
Fiscal 2006
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
Panel B: Inconsistent track record manipulation
Year
First
quarter
Second
quarter
Third
quarter
Fourth
quarter Year
Fiscal 2003
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.06 0.12 0.18
0.13
0.15 0.51
Fiscal 2004
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
0.17
0.17 0.19 0.20 0.75
Fiscal 2005
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.21 0.25
0.12
0.16 0.18 0.80
Fiscal 2006
Guidance
Actual EPS 0.19
Notes:
Experiment 2 manipulates the ﬁrm’s guidance track record by varying the
consistency in the downward bias associated with management guidance issued by
management in prior periods. All analysts are told that they have developed a
good relationship with the ﬁrm’s management over time (relationship incentives).
Panels A and B show the ﬁrm’s guidance track record that is shown to analysts.
For both consistent and inconsistent Track Record manipulations, the average
guidance bias over the three periods is a downward bias of two cents ()$0.02). In
the consistent Track Record manipulation, each period is associated with the same
amount of downward bias of two cents. In the inconsistent Track Record manipu-
lation, Fiscal 2003 has a downward bias of two cents, Fiscal 2004 has no bias, and
Fiscal 2005 has a downward bias of four cents.
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Method
Experiment 2 involves two treatment conditions where the guidance bias is
either consistent or inconsistent over time. Participants are 34 experienced
sell-side ﬁnancial analysts from another investment banking, trading, and
brokerage ﬁrm. Eighteen of them are randomly assigned to the consistent
condition, with the remaining sixteen assigned to the inconsistent condition.
They complete the experiment over the participating ﬁrm’s web-server.
Their average experience as an analyst is 7.32 years, and twenty-eight of
them are chartered ﬁnancial analysts.12 Analysts who participate in Experi-
ment 2 are not the same as those involved in Experiment 1.
The design is identical to that used in the relationship ⁄ consistent and
relationship ⁄ inconsistent conditions in Experiment 1, except that the down-
ward bias is doubled: consistently 2 cents for each period in the consistent
condition, and 2 cents, 0 cents, and 4 cents in the inconsistent condition
(see Table 3 for details).
Results
All analysts correctly answer the manipulation check questions on their
relationship with management. On the question of whether prior period’s
management guidance is always too high, too low, or about right (1: much
too low; 5: about right; 9: much too high), the mean response is 1.97 (range
between 1 and 4). Thus, all analysts are aware that the guidance is down-
wardly biased. Finally, participants in the consistent track record condition
all agree that management’s guidance is different from actual earnings by
the same amount each time such guidance is provided, and participants in
the inconsistent condition all disagree with this statement.
Analysts’ mean current quarter forecast is 19.33 cents (standard devia-
tion = 0.69 cents) in the consistent condition, reﬂecting an upward adjust-
ment of 1.33 cents. As expected, this forecast is signiﬁcantly higher than the
management guidance of 18 cents (t = 8.246, p = 0.000). However, the
adjustment of 1.33 cents is signiﬁcantly lower than the full guidance bias of
two cents (t = )4.123, p = 0.001).
12. According to our prediction depicted in Figure 1, the combination of a ﬂat line (as in
Experiment 1) and a slope (as in Experiment 2) suggests an ordinal Experiment by
Track Record interaction. ANOVA results reveals signiﬁcant main effects (p < 0.026)
and no interaction effect (p = 0.914). However, the traditional ANOVA is not designed
to detect ordinal interactions (Rosnow and Rosenthal 1995). To test for this ordinal
interaction, we use a linear contrast of cell means recommended for testing this pattern
(Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; Rosnow and Rosenthal 1995), with weights of +3 for
the Experiment 2 ⁄ consistent cell, +1 for the Experiment 2 ⁄ inconsistent cell, and )2 for
the Experiment 1 ⁄ consistent and Experiment 1 ⁄ inconsistent cells. The contrast is
statistically signiﬁcant (t = 5.933, p = 0.000), supporting the ordinal interaction pat-
tern. A caveat to this analysis is that it involves data collected from different ﬁrms, over
different time periods, and without complete randomization across all conditions.
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In the inconsistent condition, the mean current quarter forecast is
18.88 cents (standard deviation = 0.81 cents), which reﬂects an adjustment
of 0.88 cents. This forecast is signiﬁcantly greater than the management
guidance of 18 cents (t = 4.341, p = 0.001), but the adjustment is signiﬁ-
cantly lower than the full adjustment of two cents (t = )5.582, p = 0.000).
The adjustment is greater in the consistent condition than in the incon-
sistent condition (t = 1.791, p = 0.042, one-tailed), consistent with our
predictions.13,14
5. Conclusion
We report the results of two experiments designed to explain why analysts
do not adjust their forecasts to account for the tendency for ﬁrms to issue
downwardly-biased guidance, even though they are aware of this tendency
(e.g., Tan et al. 2002). In Experiment 1, we manipulate analysts’ incentives
by instructing them either that their concern is about being accurate (accu-
racy incentives) or that they have developed a good relationship with man-
agement (relationship incentives). We demonstrate that when analysts are
shown a track record of the ﬁrm’s history of earnings and guidance, they
will adjust for ﬁrm-speciﬁc guidance bias when they have accuracy incen-
tives, but not when they have relationship incentives. This difference in bias
adjustment as a function of incentives is larger when the guidance track
record is inconsistent (vs. consistent). In the debrieﬁng, analysts are unani-
mous in indicating that having the ﬁrm’s actual earnings beat their forecast
by a small amount improves relationships with management, but issuing a
forecast above management’s current guidance such that the ﬁrm fails to
meet or beat the forecast harms such relationships. This strongly suggests
that analysts believe that maintaining a good relationship with management
matters in a post-Regulation FD environment. To the extent that maintain-
ing good relationships with management is widely held to be important by
analysts, our results suggest that this incentive is a signiﬁcant factor in
explaining why analysts do not adjust for management guidance bias, even
when there is evidence of a consistent ﬁrm-speciﬁc guidance bias.
In Experiment 2, we ﬁnd that when the magnitude of the average down-
ward guidance bias increases to two cents (versus one cent in Experiment 1),
analysts with relationship incentives partially adjust for the guidance bias
both in the consistent and inconsistent track record conditions, with the
adjustment larger in the former situation. Overall, our results in Experiments
1 and 2 are consistent with an elastic justiﬁcation explanation (Hsee 1995),
which posits that the extent to which analysts concerned with relationship
incentives make adjustments for guidance bias is higher (lower) when manage-
ment’s guidance track record is consistent (inconsistent) over time; this elastic
justiﬁcation explanation is subject to the constraint that the adjustments do
13. Conﬁdence in the forecasts is not signiﬁcantly different between the consistent and
inconsistent conditions (t = 1.601, p = 0.119).
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not create a risk of causing the reporting company to miss the forecast. When
such adjustments might cause a missed forecast, adjustments are not made.
Prior research indicates that guidance bias in the marketplace is rela-
tively small (around one cent) (DeGeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser 1999; Baik
and Jiang 2006), which suggests another reason why analysts might not
adjust for this bias, as shown in Experiment 1. Nevertheless, results from
Experiment 2 reveal that when the guidance track record bias is relatively
large, analysts seem to tradeoff some accuracy with their desire to maintain
a good relationship with management.
Overall, these ﬁndings contribute to the literature on analysts’ forecasts
by providing the ﬁrst empirical evidence indicating conditions under which
analysts will and will not adjust for bias in the guidance issued by manage-
ment. Prior research ﬁnds that analysts generally fail to fully adjust for this
bias. We show that, depending on the combination of guidance history
consistency and analyst incentives, analysts fully adjust, partially adjust, or
do not adjust for guidance bias. Our study has implications for regulators
seeking to reduce analysts’ conﬂict of interest through changes in ﬁrms’
selective disclosures to analysts as well as reforms to analysts’ compen-
sation structures (Schroeder 2002). Our ﬁndings suggest that in a post-
Regulation FD environment, incentives to maintain a good relationship
with management continue to motivate and inﬂuence analysts’ judgments.
Also, regulators may only be looking at part of the picture when they
focus on analyst incentives (Schroeder 2002) in that the consistency of
guidance track record matters. Finally, archival studies of responses to
management guidance need to consider both accuracy and bias in manage-
ment’s guidance track record and analysts’ differing incentives. Our results
also indicate the possibility that other aspects of guidance track record,
such as frequency and timing, can affect the impact of guidance on
analysts’ and investors’ responses.
A caveat to interpreting our results is that our participating analysts
do not face actual performance-contingent rewards as a function of their
incentives, which they would in practice. Our constraint is that manipulat-
ing actual rewards that ﬁnancially motivate such highly-paid analysts
would be challenging and likely impractical. Furthermore, our design does
not allow us to determine the speciﬁc manner in which analysts trade off
maintaining accuracy and developing good management relationships. In
an experimental setting with analysts as participants, we cannot be sure of
the exact magnitude of the importance of accuracy versus pleasing man-
agement, because we cannot control the knowledge and experiences that
these participants bring to the task. In addition, our ﬁndings related to
management guidance history may not generalize beyond the speciﬁc pat-
tern and magnitude of the guidance bias we employ in our experiments.
For example, the guidance error in Experiment 2 is larger than the
median bias documented in Baik and Jiang (2006). In Experiments 1 and
2, we used a speciﬁc pattern of guidance error for the inconsistent
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guidance history condition, and our results may not generalize to other
patterns of inconsistent guidance history. Another limitation is that the
guidance track record is shown in a summary form which facilitates cog-
nitive processing, although our discussions with analysts indicate that they
keep similar records. Presumably, adjustments, if any, would be smaller
and slower in circumstances where multiple ﬁrms are followed, patterns of
bias are less obvious, and intervening information announcements degrade
the learning environment. However, we note that even in this ideal learn-
ing environment, analysts fail to adjust fully for guidance bias in all situa-
tions involving high relationship incentives, regardless of the size of the
guidance bias.
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